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Regret and disappointment are emotions that can be experi-
enced in response to an unfavorable outcome of a decision. Previ-
ous research suggests that both emotions are related to the
process of counterfactual thinking. The present research extends
this idea by combining it with ideas from regret and disappoint-
ment theory. The results show that regret is related to behavior-
focused counterfactual thought in which the decision-maker’s
own actions are changed, whereas disappointment is related to
situation-focused counterfactual thought in which aspects of the
situation are changed. In Study 1 participants (N 5 130) were
asked to recall an autobiographical episode of either a regretful
or a disappointing event. When asked to undo this event, regret
participants predominantly changed their own actions, whereas
disappointment participants predominantly changed aspects of
the situation. In Study 2 all participants (N 5 50) read a scenario
in which a person experiences a negative event. Participants who
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were instructed to undo the event by changing the person’s
actions reported more regret than disappointment, while partici-
pants who were instructed to undo the event by changing aspects
ofthe situationreported moredisappointment thanregret. Study
3( N 5 140) replicated the findings from Study 2 with a different
scenario, and a design in which regret and disappointment were
measured between rather than within subjects. In the discussion
we address the relation among counterfactual thinking, attribu-
tions and affective reactions to decision outcomes, and the impli-
cations for decision research. q 1998 Academic Press
Decision outcomes often evoke emotional reactions. For example, one can be
disappointed when finding out that the outcome of a chosen option is worse
than what was initially expected, or one can feel regret upon discovering that
one would have obtained a better outcome had one chosen another option. Of
course, these emotional reactions influence our satisfaction with the obtained
decision outcome, or, in other words, its utility. Thus, when buying a new VCR,
the satisfaction or utility derived from that particular VCR depends not only
on the attributes of VCR itself but also on how it compares to the prior set
expectations and the attributes of unchosen alternatives. This psychological
process of comparing the obtained outcome with other possible outcomes has
become known as counterfactual thinking.
In the present paper we focus on how these counterfactual thoughts about
“what might have been” influence specific emotional reactions to decision out-
comes. We argue that the content of the counterfactual thoughts (i.e., the
specific alternative outcome to which the obtained outcome is compared) has
an impact on which emotion is experienced. Studying how these psychological
processes cause these specific emotional reactions is not only interesting for
its own sake. As shown by recent empirical research, people anticipate emo-
tions, and take them into account when making decisions (e.g., Beattie, Baron,
Hershey, & Spranca, 1994; Inman & Zeelenberg, 1998; Larrick & Boles, 1995;
Ritov, 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt &
de Vries, 1996). Knowledge about the role of counterfactual thought in the
experience of emotions can therefore help us understand the role of emotions
in decision-making.
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING
Counterfactual thinking involves mentally mutating one or more aspects of
a past event. It includes thoughts in which current reality is changed into
what might, could, would, or should have been. By mentally simulating what
happenedandcomparingittowhatmightotherwisehavehappened,anindivid-
ual can come to an understanding of how reality came about. An individual
can rerun what has happened, while changing aspects of his or her own actions,
and see if, and how, this would have made a difference. In these simulationsREGRET AND DISAPPOINTMENT 119
one can also change aspects of the situation and examine whether these differ-
encescouldhavepreventedsomethingfromhappening,orwouldhavepromoted
the occurrence of other events. In this way counterfactual thinking may influ-
ence an individual’s attributions for the current reality (Kahneman, 1992;
Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Wells & Gavanski, 1989).
In addition to this influence on attributions, counterfactual thinking has
also been shown to influence individuals’ emotional reactions to outcomes and
events (e.g., Boles & Messick, 1995; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Medvec,
Madey, & Gilovich, 1995). For example, if one wins a small prize in a lottery,
satisfaction with this prize is not always easily predicted. How satisfied one
feels depends very much on which alternative to reality (or default) comes to
mind. Where winning a larger prize is the alternative to reality, one would be
less satisfied than if winning no prize at all is construed as the alternative.
Thus, by constructing alternatives with which reality is contrasted, counterfac-
tual thinking can influence the intensity of an emotional reaction; this has
been referred to as emotional amplification (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).
In the present research we build upon Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski’s
(1994) recent work on the effects of counterfactual thinking. These authors
showedthat counterfactualthoughtcan influenceemotionalreactions toevents
in a way that goes beyond mere amplification. Specifically, they argued that
“. . . counterfactual thinking mediates affect, and . . . that through its role in
assessments of causation, counterfactual thinking helps to shape the specific
emotions an individual experiences in reaction to a situation” (p. 585, italics
added). In their research Niedenthal et al. focused on the emotions guilt and
shame, emotions that have the same negative valence but different phenome-
nologies. They found that experiences of shame were related to counterfactual
thoughts in which aspects of the self were mutated, whereas experiences of
guilt were related to counterfactual thoughts in which aspects of one’s behavior
were mutated. In the present research we focus on two related emotions: regret
and disappointment. These emotions share with guilt and shame the character-
isticsthatvalenceisnegative,andthattheyareassociatedwithmentalundoing
(Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van
der Pligt, 1998c). However, they also differ from guilt and shame in important
respects (cf. Landman, 1993; Zeelenberg, 1996). Experiences of guilt and shame
generally arise when some norm, moral or social, is violated. Regret and disap-
pointment are related to social or moral norms to a much lesser extent. These
emotions are more utilitarian, that is, they are more related to the hedonic
value of decision outcomes or events. This presumably is why disappointment
and (in particular) regret have attracted so much attention in research on
individual decision-making (see e.g., Beattie et al., 1994; Bell, 1982, 1985;
Gull, 1991; Kelsey & Schepanski, 1991; Inman, Dyer, & Jia, 1997; Inman &
McAlister, 1994; Inman & Zeelenberg, 1998; Janis & Mann, 1977; Josephs,
Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992; Larrick & Boles, 1995; Loomes & Sugden,
1982, 1986, 1987; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Richard, van der
Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Ritov, 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1995; Taylor, 1997; van
Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997; Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997;120 ZEELENBERG ET AL.
Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998a). This decision research has
shown that both regret and disappointment have clear behavioral conse-
quences. These consequences may arise from both the anticipation of these
emotions and from their experiences. Although decision research (often implic-
itly) suggests that different sorts of counterfactual thinking give rise to regret
and disappointment, empirical studies that focus explicitly on the antecedents
of regret and disappointment are relatively sparse. Before addressing these
proposed differences in the antecedents of the experience of regret and disap-
pointment in more detail, we focus on the experience itself.
ARE REGRET AND DISAPPOINTMENT DIFFERENT EMOTIONS?
Our key prediction is that the difference between regret and disappointment
resides in the differential counterfactual thought processes giving rise to the
emotions. An important question is whether regret and disappointment differ
with respect to experiential content. In other words, are regret and disappoint-
ment really two distinct emotions, each with its own characteristics, or are
they essentially similar experiences that go by different names? Emotion re-
searchers argue that emotions can be differentiated on the basis of the apprais-
als associated with the specific emotions (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman,
Antoniou, & Jose, 1996), and on basis of their phenomenologies (Roseman,
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). We recently addressed whether regret and disappoint-
ment could be differentiated on the basis of their appraisals and their phenome-
nologies (see, van Dijk, van der Pligt, & Zeelenberg, 1998; Zeelenberg et al.,
1998c).
Appraisal theorists state that each emotion can be related to specific patterns
of evaluations and interpretations of events (“appraisals”). Some theorists ar-
gue for a strong causal relationship between appraisals and emotions (e.g.,
Lazarus, 1991). Others argue that although appraisals do not always cause
the emotions or determine which specific emotion is experienced, they may
characterize emotions (Parkinson, 1997). In our appraisal study we focused on
the appraisal pattern of several different negative emotions, but for the sake
of brevity we will only discuss the relations between regret and disappointment
(see, van Dijk et al., 1998). We asked participants to recall and describe a
situation in which they felt either intense regret or intense disappointment,
and subsequently assessed their appraisals. Eight different appraisal dimen-
sions were included: unexpectedness, motivational state, situational state,
probability, control potential, legitimacy, problem source, and agency, the last
of which was measured by three items (self-agency, other-person-agency, and
circumstances-agency). Roseman et al. (1996) found that these appraisal items
differentiatedclearly betweendifferent emotions.Our studyshowed significant
differences between regret and disappointment on five appraisal dimensions,
namely: unexpectedness, motivational state, control potential, legitimacy, and
agency (self-agency and circumstances-agency). Disappointment received
higherratingswith respecttounexpectedness,wanting somethingpleasurable,
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anyone’scontrol.Regret,ontheotherhand,receivedhigherratingswithrespect
to thinking that one could do something about the event, and self-causation.
In our study on the phenomenological experience of regret and disappoint-
ment we also asked participants to recall an instance of intense regret or
disappointment, and to indicate what they felt, thought, felt like doing, did,
and wanted during this experience (Zeelenberg et al., 1998c). We asked about
these five different aspects of an emotional experience (i.e., feelings, thoughts,
action tendencies, actions, and emotivations) because previous research had
shown that discrete emotions can be differentiated on the basis of these aspects
(Roseman et al., 1994). There were several significant differences between
regret and disappointment in each category. These differences were most pro-
nounced for action tendencies (referring to what participants felt like doing
during the experience) and for emotivations (referring to specific emotional
motives or goalsthat participants had during theexperience). More specifically,
we found that the experience of regret could be differentiated from that of
disappointment in that the former involves feeling more intensely that one
shouldhaveknown better,thinkingaboutwhatamistake onehasmade,feeling
a tendency to kick oneself and to correct one’s mistake, wanting to undo the
event and to get a second chance. We also found that the experience of disap-
pointment, more than that of regret, involves feeling powerless, feeling a ten-
dency to do nothing and to get away from the situation, actually turning away
from the event, and wanting to do nothing.
Taken together, we found that regret and disappointment are associated with
different appraisal patterns and that they have different phenomenologies.
Although we acknowledge that regret and disappointment have a much in
common(botharerelatedtoriskydecisionmakinganduncertainoutcomes,and
originate in a comparison process in which the outcome obtained is compared to
an outcome that might have been), we interpret the findings of these studies
as indicating that regret and disappointment are different emotions.
REGRET AND DISAPPOINTMENT THEORIES
Ideas about the role of regret and disappointment in decision-making were
formalized by the economists Bell (1982, 1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1982,
1986, 1987). In their regret and disappointment theories they explicitly state
that decision-makers can experience emotions as a consequence of a decision.
Regret and disappointment theories also state that people anticipate these
post-decisional emotions, and take them into account when making decisions.
The major difference in the antecedents of regret and disappointment, ac-
cording to these theories, is the source of comparison from which the emotions
arise. Although regret and disappointment both stem from a comparison be-
tween “what is” and “what might have been,” regret is assumed to originate
from comparisons between the factual outcome and an outcome that might
have been had you chosen another action; disappointment is assumed to origi-
nate from a comparison between the factual outcome and an outcome that
might have been had another state of the world occurred. This difference can122 ZEELENBERG ET AL.
be illustrated by the choice depicted in Table 1, where the outcome of the two
actions (A or B) depends on the occurrence of one of four possible states of the
world. According to regret theory, a decision-maker will feel regret after having
chosen action A, and state of the world S2 occurs. Regret occurs because the
decision-maker knows that given this state of the world, action B would have
resulted in a much better outcome. An example in which a decision-maker will
feel disappointment, according to disappointment theory, will be when he or
she chose action B, and state of the world S4 were to occur. The outcome
obtained in this combination, $25, is worse than the majority of outcomes which
would have occurred in another state of the world. Note that although one
should experience disappointment when confronted with this outcome, one
should not experience regret, since the outcome of the rejected action was
even worse.
NORM THEORY, REGRET, AND DISAPPOINTMENT
The ideas in regret and disappointment theory concerning the causes of
regret and disappointment are easily combined with the counterfactual think-
ing approach derived from norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; see also
Kahneman, 1992). Norm theory proposes that every outcome or event brings
its own post-computed norm, or frame of reference, into being by the process
of counterfactual thought. Evaluative reactions to outcomes are based on a
comparison between these outcomes and the post-computed norm. In regret
and disappointment theory it is assumed that the decision-maker has prior
knowledge of all possible actions and the related outcomes for each state of
theworld.Inotherwords,foreachdecisionthedecision-makerknowsadecision
table similar to the one depicted in Table 1. The decision outcomes are then
evaluated in relation to the other possible outcomes. In most real-life decisions,
however, not all possible actions or states of the world are known. In these
cases, as norm theory suggests, decision-makers can imagine possible out-
comes that would have occurred, had things been different; that is, they can
generate counterfactuals. Evaluative reactions to the factual outcome can then
be based on the comparison of this outcome to the post-computed counter-
factual alternatives.
Regret and disappointment theories suggest that two different sorts of count-
erfactuals produce regret and disappointment. Recall that according to regret
TABLE 1
Outcomes of Actions A and B for Each Possible State of the World
States of the world
Actions S1 (25%) S2 (25%) S3 (25%) S4 (25%)
A $100 $50 $25 $0
B $0 $100 $50 $25
Note. This table depicts a choice between actions A and B, for which the outcomes depend on
the state of the world that occurs. Each state of the world has a probability of 25%.REGRET AND DISAPPOINTMENT 123
theory, regret is caused by comparing the outcomes of different actions given
a certain state of the world. The decision-maker controls which action is chosen.
Thus, undoing the outcome implies changing the decision-maker’s choice. In
counterfactual thinking terms, this implies that one feels regret when one
generates a counterfactual in which the outcome is undone by changing some-
thing that was under one’s personal control (e.g., one’s reasoned actions or
decisions). Henceforth, we will refer to these counterfactuals as behavior-fo-
cused counterfactuals. According to disappointment theory, disappointment is
caused by comparing the outcomes of different states of the world given a
chosen option. Undoing the outcome implies changing the states of the world.
Thisimpliesthatonefeelsdisappointmentwhenonegeneratesacounterfactual
in which the outcome is undone by changing something that was not under
one’s control (e.g., another person’s behavior or something in the situation).
Henceforth we will refer to these counterfactuals as situation-focused
counterfactuals.
In sum, we argue that theemotions regret and disappointment have different
causes. Based on a combination of regret theory and disappointment theory,
on the one hand, and norm theory, on the other, we propose that regret is the
result of the generation of behavior-focused counterfactuals, and that disap-
pointment is the result of the generation of situation-focused counterfactuals.
This reasoning is nicely illustrated by the following citation in which the emo-
tional reaction to an event depends heavily upon what is thought to be mutable:
“The child is disappointed when the Tooth Fairy forgets his third lost tooth.
The child’s parents regret the lapse” (Landman, 1993, p. 47).
STUDY 1
In Study 1 we investigate counterfactual thinking about real-life events.
Participants were asked to recall and describe an event from their own lives
in which they experienced either intense regret or intense disappointment.
Next they were asked to undo the event by generating four counterfactuals.
These were then coded as addressing behaviors (i.e., things that were under
the participant’s control), or as aspects of the situation, or the participant’s
character (i.e., things that were not under the participant’s control). We expec-
ted that regret participants would predominantly mutate things that were
undertheircontrol,whereasdisappointmentparticipantswouldpredominantly
mutate things that were not under their control.
We also assessed ratings of emotions felt during the experience of the event.
We asked for ratings of regret, disappointment, and general affect. We expected
thatregretparticipantswouldreportahighlevelofregret,thatdisappointment
participants would report a high level of disappointment, and that regret and
disappointment ratings would be negatively related to each other (see also
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998b). We hoped that both groups of
participants would report the same level of general negative affect, so that
possible differences between the two groups would not be confounded with
differences in overall negativity. Ratings of guilt and shame were also assessed.124 ZEELENBERG ET AL.
Like regret and disappointment, these emotions are related to counterfactual
thinking (Niedenthal et al., 1994). Inclusion of these variables enabled us to
examinetherelationshipsamongthesefournegativeemotions.Weexpectthese
two emotions to be more closely related to regret than to disappointment,
because regret, guilt and shame all share a sense of responsibility for the
negative outcome or event.
Thelastsetofvariablesincludedinthisstudyrelatedtointernalandexternal
attribution. Niedenthal et al. (1994) argued that the shaping of emotions
through counterfactual thinking might occur through the role played by count-
erfactuals in assessments of causation. However, in their study attributions
were not assessed. Research by Wells and Gavanski (1989) shows that people
use counterfactual thinking in assessing the causal role of events (see also
Lipe, 1991). In their first experiment, Wells and Gavanski asked participants
to read a vignette in which a woman dies from an allergic reaction to a dish
ordered by her boss. The boss was described as having considered the ordered
dish and an alternative dish. When the alternative dish did not contain the
allergic ingredient, the boss’ role in the woman’s tragic death was judged as
more causal than when the other dish also contained the allergic ingredient.
It appears that people attribute outcomes to those factors that are imagined
to covary with those outcomes. Thus counterfactual thoughts about how an
outcome was achieved can influence the attributions that people make. This,
in turn, could influence the affective reaction to the outcome (cf. Weiner,
1982, 1986).
In short, we suggest that the effects of behavior-focused counterfactuals on
regret is more strongly mediated by internal attributions, and that the effects
of situation-focused counterfactuals on disappointment is more strongly medi-
ated by external attributions (cf. Zeelenberg et al., 1998b).
Method
Design and participants. The study had a 2-group between-subjects design
(Regret vs. Disappointment). Students at the University of Amsterdam (N 5
130) participated in this experiment, which was part of a larger experimental
session. There were 65 participants per condition. They were paid 10 Dutch
Guilders (approximately $6.50 at the time of the study) for their participation.
Procedure and material. Booklets containing the questionnaires were ran-
domly distributed among the participants. The experiment lasted about 15
min. Depending upon the condition they were in, participants were asked
to describe an occasion in which they felt either intense regret or intense
disappointment.The completeinstructionin theregret [disappointment]condi-
tion read (translated from the original Dutch): “We would like you to recall an
event from your own life in which you felt intense regret [disappointment].
Provide a detailed and comprehensive description of this event. You may use
the whole page for your description. If you need more space, please continue
on the reverse of this page. Provide a description that is comprehensive enough
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Next, on the subsequent page, mutations were measured by asking the parti-
cipants to complete four “If only . . .” stems. The complete instruction read
(translated from the original Dutch): “The event you described could, of course,
have had a better ending. What could have been different about yourself, your
behavior, or the situation so that the event would have had a better ending?
Please describe four things that would have resulted in a better ending if only
they were different.”
Then, on again a subsequent page participants were asked to rate on the
scales below the extent to which they experienced the emotions regret, disap-
pointment, guilt and shame during the event. These were measured on 10-
point scales with endpoints labeled none (1) and very much (10). A general
affective reaction was assessed by asking how the event made them feel in
general. This was measured on an 11-point scale, with endpoints labeled very
good (25) and very bad (5).
Attributions were assessed on the next page. Participants were asked “How
responsible do you find yourself for the event?” to be answered on a 10-point
scale with endpoints labeled not responsible (1) and very responsible (10). They
were also asked “To what extent did you cause the event?” and “To what extent
did external factors cause the event?” These questions were to be answered on
10-point scales with endpoints labeled a very small extent (1) and a very great
extent (10).
Half the participants completed the procedure in the order described above,
while the other half was asked first for the ratings, and then for mutations.
Since there were no order effects, data from the two groups were analyzed
together.
Results
Mutations. The main hypothesis was that participants in the regret condi-
tion would prefer to mutate things that were under their own control, and
thus generate behavior-focused counterfactuals, whereas participants in the
disappointment condition would prefer to mutate things that were not under
their control, and thus generate situation-focused counterfactuals. In order to
test this prediction two independent judges, blind to the experimental condi-
tions, coded the “If only” completions as addressing the participant’s behavior,
their character, or aspects of the situation. For example, completions in which
acts or non-acts of the participant were mutated (e.g., those that took the form
of “If only I had invited more people, my party would have been successful”)
were coded as addressing behavior. Completions focusing on more or less
chronic or enduring aspects of the participant, or who or what s/he is, were
coded as character mutations (e.g., “If only I was more persistent, he would
have wanted to go out with me”). Finally, the completions relating to external
forces were coded as addressing situational aspects (e.g., “If only the exam
would have been easier, I would have passed”). The interrater agreement for
these judgments was 86%; disagreements were resolved by discussion. The
data set contained a total of 486 mutations (not all participants completed all126 ZEELENBERG ET AL.
TABLE 2
First (within Parentheses) and Total of Mutations by Category for the Regret and
Disappointment Conditions (Study 1)
Mutations
Condition Behavior Character Situation Mutation index
Regret 132 (44) 34 (8) 76 (13) 2.113 (2.354)
Disappointment 91 (26) 44 (10) 98 (29) .246 ( .200)
Note. The mutation index is a mean score of the mutations generated, in which the mutations
of behavior were coded as 21 and the mutations of character and situation as 11. This mutation
index could range from 21, if only behaviors were mutated, to 11, if only aspects of the situation
or their character were mutated. The mutation index based on only the first mutation is shown
within parentheses.
four ‘If only’ stems). Only 11 out of the 486 (2.4%) were uncodable. All analyses
were done using the remaining 475 mutations. Table 2 shows the results for
both the first mutations generated and for the total number of mutations
generated. Separate analyses were carried out on the first mutations generated
because these presumably reflect the most accessible beliefs about alternatives
to reality (cf. Niedenthal et al., 1994). It can be seen that, for both the first
and the total number of mutations, behavior was mutated most often in the
regret condition, and situation was mutated most often in the disappoint-
ment condition.
For purposes of statistical analyses we coded the mutations of behavior as
21, and mutations of situational aspects and mutations of the participant’s
character as 1. We decided to combine the mutations of situational and charac-
ter because both mutations focus on things that are not directly under the
volitional control of the decision-maker (cf. Markman & Weary, 1997). In con-
trast, mutations of behavior focus on actions of the decision-maker that were
under his or her control. These uncontrollable and controllable aspects can be
seen respectively as related to the decision-maker’s actions and to the possible
states of the world depicted in Table 1.1 A Chi-square test for 2 3 2 tables with
first mutations as dependent variables shows that participants in the Regret
condition tended to mutate the controllable aspects (i.e., behavior) more often,
and that that participants in the Disappointment condition tended to mutate
the uncontrollable aspects (i.e., situation and character) more often; x2 (1) 5
9.95, p , .01. Next, the data for all mutations were analyzed. This was done
by computing a mean mutation index (both mutation indices are depicted in
Table 2), in which all mutations per participant were summed and divided by
the total number of mutations generated by that participant. This analysis
yielded the same result, t(128) 5 3.37, p , .001.
1 Alternatively, one might argue that mutations of ones character should be coded as 0 because
they fall in between mutations of behavior and mutations of situation (character mutations could
be regarded as the mutation of things that are not really controllable, but neither uncontrollable).
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Ratings. Table 3 depicts the mean responses on the five emotion and four
attribution rating scales. Regret was the dominant emotion in the regret condi-
tion: Within this condition ratings of regret were significantly higher than
ratings of all other emotions, all ts(64) . 2.62, ps , .05. In the Disappointment
condition, ratings of disappointment were significantly higher than ratings of
all other emotions, all ts(64) . 11.90, ps , .001.
Moreover, a MANOVA with condition (Regret vs. Disappointment) as the
independent variable and the emotion and attribution scales as dependent
variables revealed a significant multivariate difference between the two condi-
tions, F(8,121) 5 21.97, p , .001. Univariate tests showed that a significant
difference existed for 7 of the 8 ratings (see Table 3). All differences were in
the predicted direction.
Participants in the Regret condition reported more regret than did those in
the Disappointment condition, and participants in the Disappointment condi-
tion reported more disappointment than did those in the Regret condition.
The high levels of regret and disappointment reported in the corresponding
conditions show that participants did indeed recall events in which they experi-
enced intense regret or disappointment. It is important to note that in both
conditions the recalled events were associated with the same level of general
negative affect.
As anticipated, participants who recalled an experience of intense regret
reported having experienced more guilt and shame than did participants who
recalled an experience of intense disappointment. This suggested that guilt
TABLE 3
Means for the Dependent Variables in the Regret and Disappointment
Conditions (Study 1)
Condition
Dependent Variables Regret Disappointment F(1,128) p ,
Emotions
Regret 8.32 4.65 76.51 .001
Disappointment 6.49 9.02 64.35 .001
Guilt 7.48 4.03 54.52 .001
Shame 6.66 4.43 18.15 .001
General Affect 3.28 3.26 0.01 ns.
Attributions
Responsibility 7.85 5.15 35.60 .001
Internal attribution 7.75 4.92 39.93 .001
External attribution 5.29 7.28 19.68 .001
Note. Entries for regret, disappointment, guilt and shame are mean answers on 10-point scales
with endpoints labeled none (1) and very much (10). Entries for General Affect are mean answers
on a 11-point scale, with endpoints labeled very good (25) and very bad (5). Entries for attributions
are mean answers to “How responsible do you find yourself for the event?”, measured on a 10-
point scale with endpoints labeled not responsible (1) and very responsible (10), and mean answers
“To what extent did you cause the event?” and “To what extent did external factors cause the
event?” measured on a 10-point scale with endpoints labeled a very small extent (1) and a very
great extent (10).128 ZEELENBERG ET AL.
and shame are more closely related to regret than to disappointment. Support
for this was also found in the correlations between the different emotions (see
Table 4 for correlations among the dependent variables). Regret, guilt and
shame were all positively correlated, whereas the correlations between these
emotions and disappointment were all negative. Moreover, the absolute magni-
tude of the correlations of regret with guilt and shame are greater than those
for disappointment with guilt and shame.
Attribution ratings were also in accordance with our predictions. Regret
participants judged themselves as more responsible for the event than did
Disappointment participants. Regret participants also judged the extent to
which they caused the event to be greater than did Disappointment partici-
pants. Disappointment participants judged the extent to which external factors
caused the event to be greater than did Regret participants.
Relation among mutations, attributions, and emotions. The central argu-
ment in this paper is that regret and disappointment are related to different
types of counterfactual thinking. We argue that regret is related to behavioral-
focused counterfactual thinking, and that disappointment is related to situa-
tion-focused counterfactual thinking. As can be seen in Table 4, the significant
correlations between the mutation index and the reported regret and disap-
pointment support this reasoning. The negative correlation between the muta-
tion index and regret indicates that as the mutations become more behavior-
focused, regret becomes more intense. The positive correlation between the
mutation index and disappointment indicates that as the mutations become
more situation-focused, disappointment becomes more intense.
Niedenthal et al. (1994) argued that the effects of counterfactual thinking
are mediated by attributional processes. However, they did not assess attribu-
tions, and were therefore unable to test this argument. Attributions were
measured in the present study. As shown in Table 4, the correlations between
regret and the different attribution measures were significant and in the pre-
dicted direction (positive correlations with internal attribution and responsibil-
ity, and a negative correlation with external attribution), indicating that more
internal attributions were associated with more intense regret. For disappoint-
ment thesecorrelations showed thereverse pattern, indicating thatmore exter-
nalattributionswereassociatedwithmoreintensedisappointment.Forfurther
analyses we combined the three attribution ratings, after reverse scoring the
measure of external factors, into one measure (Cronbach’s a 5 0.88). This new
attribution scale could range from 1 to 10, with higher scores implying more
internal attributions.
A series of regression equations were calculated to test for mediation
(cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986). These tests were done separately for regret and
disappointment, using the whole data set for both analyses. The predictor
variable in these equations was the mutation index, the mediator was the score
on the attribution scale, and either regret or disappointment served as the
outcome variable. To test for mediation we first regressed the mediator on
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.130 ZEELENBERG ET AL.
variable, and finally regressed the outcome variable on both the predictor
variable and the mediator. Perfect mediation holds when: (a) the predictor
affects the mediator in the first equation; (b) the predictor affects the outcome
in the second equation; (c) the mediator affects the outcome in the third equa-
tion; and (d) when the predictor has no effect when controlling for the mediator
in the third equation.
The results of these regression equations are depicted in Fig. 1. The values
in this figure are standardized regression weights. The upper half of this figure
showsresultsforregret.Theseshowthat: (a)mutationspredictattributions;(b)
mutations predict regret (upper left-hand corner beta weight); (c) attributions
predict regret; and (d) mutations have no predictive power when controlling
for attributions (upper right-hand corner beta weight). Attributions can there-
fore be said to mediate the influence of mutations on regret. Similar results
were found for disappointment (see lower half of Fig. 1).
Discussion
The results of this study confirm the hypothesis concerning the role of count-
erfactual thinking in regret and disappointment. Regret experiences were more
associated with counterfactuals addressing behavioral actions, whereas disap-
pointment experiences were more associated with counterfactuals addressing
situational factors. It should be noted, however, that in spite of the significant
differences in mutation focus, participants in the regret condition also mutated
a considerable number of uncontrollable aspects of the situation, and that
participants in thedisappointment condition also mutated theirown behaviors.
This might be regarded as detrimental to our hypotheses. However, it should
be remembered that participants were explicitly asked to mutate things about
themselves, their behavior, or the situation that would have prevented the
regretted event. A more formal analysis of regret-eliciting situations shows
FIG. 1. Models testing for the mediating role of attributions (*p , .05).REGRET AND DISAPPOINTMENT 131
that regret can be undone by mutating one’s choice or the state of the world
that occurred. For example, the most regretful situation in Table 1 would be
choosing action B after which state of the world S1 occurs. After this happens
the decision-maker can mutate the choice of action B, but also the occurrence
of S1, since both would have prevented this situation from happening, and
both are thus equally valid answers to the question asked.
Moreover, outcomes of real-life decisions are almost always multiply deter-
mined. A feature of a cause is that had it been different, the event would not
have occurred. Hence, in real life one can mutate a large number of things, of
which one’s own behavior is a small, but of course salient, subset. Finally, there
are also several other factors that influence what gets mutated. For example,
people are more likely to mutate causes that are proximal in time to the focal
event than causes that are more distal in time (e.g., Miller & Gunasegaram,
1990), and they are more likely to mutate things that are under their own
control (e.g., their behaviors) than things that are not under their own control
(Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991;Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen,
1995; Roese & Olson, 1995). We regard it as telling that we found significant
differences in mutation focus for regret and disappointment, despite the fact
that what gets mutated is known to be influenced by all these other factors.
Additional findings were that experienced regret was primarily related to
internal attributions and mutations of behavior, whereas experienced disap-
pointment was primarily related to external attributions and mutations of the
situation. Mediational analyses revealed that attributions mediated the effects
of counterfactual thinking on the experience of regret and disappointment.
Summarizing, the findings support the idea that regret and disappointment
are associated with different types of counterfactual thought. These findings
suggest that counterfactual thinking not only amplifies affect, but also shapes
it. According to our reasoning, regret is shaped by the generation of behavior-
focused counterfactuals, whereas disappointment is shaped by the generation
of situation-focused counterfactuals.
STUDY 2
In Study 1 we showed that the experience of regret and disappointment is
related to two different types of counterfactuals. Although we argue that these
qualitativelydifferentcounterfactualsshapetheexperienceofregretanddisap-
pointment, and the results of mediational analyses were consistent with this
reasoning, Study 1 did not provide a direct test of this causal relationship. The
present study was developed to provide such a test. Participants in this study
had to imagine themselves in a situation that could elicit either regret or
disappointment (or a combination of the two). Half the participants were in-
structed to undo the event by mutating aspects of their behavior, while the
other half were instructed to undo the event by mutating aspects of the situa-
tion. Next, all participants were asked to indicate the level of regret and disap-
pointment they would feel in such a situation. We predicted that after mutating
behavior participants would feel more regret than disappointment, but that132 ZEELENBERG ET AL.




design (Mutate: Behavior vs. Situation). Dependent variables were ratings of
disappointment and regret. Students at the University of Amsterdam (N 5
50) participated in this experiment, which was part of a larger experimental
session. There were 25 participants per condition. They were paid 10 Guilders
(approximately $6.50) for their participation.
Procedure and material. All participants were presented with the same
scenario. They were asked to vividly imagine the events in the scenario as
happening to them, and to read the scenario twice. The scenario read as follows
(translated from the original Dutch):
Some time ago you signed up for a day trip. The trip included a visit to several buildings that
are normally not open to the public, but which were opened especially for this occasion. You
found this very attractive. You paid a non-refundable deposit of 25 Dutch Guilders.2 At 9.30
a.m. you had to be at Amsterdam Central Station where a special bus would leave.
The evening before the trip you met a friend in a bar. At first, you did not intend to make
it very late. As soon as the two of you were in the bar you started having a great time, and
quite a few drinks. It was getting late and although you realized this you decided to stay a
little longer.
Things do not go smoothly the next morning. You intended to set the alarm clock yesterday,
but forgot to do so. You have to hurry. You quickly eat something and jump on your bicycle.
Since you spent too much money yesterday you have to get some cash. You have some money
left, but you want to be sure that it is enough for the whole day. The first cash dispenser on
your route happens to be out of order. You decide to go to another one, although it is not on
your route to the station. You withdraw your money and continue your journey. There are
road works on the way to the station. You decide to ignore these. This is not good for your
tires, and you get a puncture. You abandon your bicycle and walk to a tram stop. The tram
has just departed. You take the next one and finally you’re on your way. Just before you reach
the station the tram is stopped by a group of protesters. All passengers have to get out. You
think of running to the station, but calculate that it should be possible to continue walking
at a normal pace. You decide to walk because you don’t want to feel sweaty while sitting in
the bus. When you arrive at the station you see that your calculation was wrong. You are too
late. The bus is just turning the corner and disappearing from view.
After reading the scenario, participants in the Mutate Behavior condition
were stimulated to generate behavior-focused counterfactuals. This was done
by asking them to complete two sentence stems, starting with: I fo n l yI....
The explicit instruction read (translated from the original Dutch): “Complete
the following two sentences by indicating how aspects of your own choices,
decisions, or behavior could have been different so that the event would have
had a better ending.” Participants in the Mutate Situation condition were
stimulated to engage in situation-focused counterfactual thinking. This was
done by asking them to complete two sentence stems, starting with: If only
2 Twenty-five Dutch Guilders equaled approximately $16 at the time the study was ran.REGRET AND DISAPPOINTMENT 133
....The explicit instruction read (translated from the original Dutch): “Com-
plete the following two sentences by indicating how aspects of the situation,
thus things that you could not influence yourself, could have been different so
that the event would have had a better ending.” Then participants rated the
amount of disappointment and regret they would feel after experiencing the
event. These were measured on 10-point scales with endpoints labeled none
(1) and very much (10).
Results and Discussion
The meanratings are depictedin Table5. Participants’ answerswere submit-
ted to a 2 (Mutate: Behavior vs. Situation) 3 2 (Emotion: Regret vs. Disappoint-
ment) ANOVA, with Emotion as a within-subjects factor. This analysis yielded
a main effect for Mutate, F(1,48) 5 6.42, p , .005. More interestingly, the
analysis also yielded the predicted Mutate 3 Emotion interaction, F(1,48) 5
9.89, p , .005. As expected, participants in the Mutate Behavior condition
reported more regret than disappointment, F(1,48) 5 5.85, p , .05, while
participants in the Mutate Situation condition reported more disappointment
than regret, F(1,48) 5 4.11, p , .05.
These findings are therefore supportive of the conclusion drawn from Study
1 that regret is the dominant experience when counterfactual thoughts undo
the outcome of an event by changing aspects that are under personal control,
such as one’s own choices, decisions or behavior. Disappointment, on the other
hand, is the dominant experience when counterfactual thoughts undo the out-
come of an event by changing things that are beyond one’s control, that is,
aspects of the situation.
It needs to be noted that the level of disappointment was similar in both
mutation conditions, suggesting that only regret is differentially influenced by
the two sorts of counterfactual thoughts. However, we should take note of the
factthatparticipantsinStudy2hadtoindicateboththelevelofdisappointment
and the level of regret they would feel, and they did so in this particular
order. It may have been the case that these ratings influenced each other (cf.
Niedenthal et al., 1994), and that this reactivity helped to produce the obtained
results. In order to rule out this possibility, and in order to replicate the results
of Study 2 using a different scenario, we conducted a third study.
TABLE 5
Mean Regret and Disappointment Ratings (Study 2)
Rating
Condition Regret Disappointment
Mutate Behavior 8.04a 7.00b
Mutate Situation 5.80b 7.04a
Note. Entries are mean responses to the questions: “How much regret [disappointment] would
you feel when experiencing the event?” Participants could answer both questions on 10-point
scales, with endpoints labeled none (1) and very much (10). Means within rows not sharing a
common subscript differ significantly (p , .05).134 ZEELENBERG ET AL.
STUDY 3
In Study 3 participants again read a scenario that could have elicited both
regret and disappointment. Half the participants were instructed to undo the
eventbymutatingaspectsoftheirbehavior,whiletheotherhalfwereinstructed
to undo the event by mutating aspects of the situation. Next, participants
reported either the level of regret or the level of disappointment they would
feel in such a situation. By making the measurement of these emotions a
between-subjects factor, we avoided possible problems of reactivity in their
assessment. We predicted that after mutating behavior participants would feel
more regret than disappointment, and that after mutating situational aspects
participants would feel more disappointment than regret.
Method
Design and participants. The experiment had a 2 (Mutate: Behavior vs.
Situation) 3 2 (Emotion rated: Regret vs. Disappointment) between-subject
factorial design. Students at the University of Amsterdam (N 5 140) partici-
pated in order to gain course credit. There were 35 participants per condition.
Procedure and material. Participants were again asked to read a scenario
in which a person experiences a negative event, and were instructed to vividly
imagine the situation happening to them. The scenario read as follows (trans-
lated from the original Dutch):
A few months ago you went into town one morning to buy a VCR. VCRs are generally quite
expensive, and because you do not have too much money, you have given careful thought to
this purchase. You consulted some friends, visited a few shops, and eventually you decided
to buy a Sony. Although it is quite expensive, it came out as one of the best in tests. Moreover,
one of your friends has the same model and is very happy with it. You arrive at the shop and
see that they are holding an autumn sale. They have some models at reduced prices, but sadly
enough not the one you had chosen to buy. You decide to check which models are on sale now.
The salesperson tells you that the Ariston is a very good purchase. It is a very beautiful model,
and now especially good value. Although you had originally resolved to buy the Sony, now
you have some doubts. You would save a lot of money if you bought the Ariston, and the
quality of the two probably does not differ that much. You are unsure about which one to buy
and you discuss this with the salesperson. The salesperson advises you to buy the Ariston.
This is what you eventually do. You do partly for the reasons given by the salesperson, but
also because you can take the Ariston home immediately, whereas the only Sony left is the
display model. If you were to buy the Sony you would have had to wait until the weekend,
when a new shipment is due to arrive.
You go home excited, and install your VCR right away. Soon you discover that the sound
quality is not to your liking, but you know that because it was an item on sale you cannot
get your money back. This is not the only drawback: After four months the VCR breaks down.
You return to the shop and the salesperson tells you that the warranty on sales items only
lasts three months. You can have your VCR repaired, but it will cost you at least two hundred
Dutch Guilders.3
3 Two hundred Dutch Guilders equaled approximately $130 at the time the data were collected.REGRET AND DISAPPOINTMENT 135
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to generate behavioral
or situational counterfactuals. The mutation instructions were identical to
those used in Study 2. Then participants rated either the amount of regret or
the amount of disappointment they would feel after experiencing the event.
These were measured on 10-point scales with endpoints labeled none (1) and
very much (10).
Results and Discussion
Mean regret and disappointment ratings are depicted in Table 6. These were
submittedtoa2(Mutate:Behaviorvs.Situation)32(Emotionrated:Regretvs.
Disappointment) ANOVA. This analysis yielded only a significant interaction
effect, F(1,136) 5 8.31, p , .005. Simple main effects analyses revealed that
participantswho wereinstructed tomutate theirbehavior reportedmore regret
than disappointment, F(1,136) 5 4.01, p , .05, and that participants who were
instructed to mutate situational aspects reported more disappointment than
regret, F(1,136) 5 4.30, p , .05. The findings of Study 2 were therefore
replicated.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research shows that experiences of regret and disappointment
are caused by counterfactuals that vary in focus. Counterfactual thoughts in
which decisions, choices, or reasoned actions are mutated, which we called
behavior-focused counterfactuals, result in the experience of regret. Counterfac-
tual thoughts in which aspects of the situation, or things that are beyond the
actor’s control are mutated, which we called situation-focused counterfactuals,
result in the experience of disappointment. This finding corroborates the as-
sumptions of regret and disappointment theory concerning the causes of these
emotions. Moreover, it extends these theories to situations in which the deci-
sion-maker does not know all possible options or states of the world. Our
researchshowsthatinthesesituationspeopleareabletoimagineotherpossible
outcomes (cf. Sugden, 1985), and that these imagined outcomes influence their
emotional reaction to the real outcome.
TABLE 6
Mean Regret and Disappointment Ratings (Study 3)
Rating
Condition Regret Disappointment
Mutate Behavior 8.17a 7.37b
Mutate Situation 7.67b 8.49a
Note. Entries are answers to the questions: “How much regret [disappointment] would you feel
when experiencing the event?” Participants answered the regret or the disappointment question.
Participants could answer on a 10-point scale, with endpoints labeled none (1) and very much (10).
Means within rows not sharing a common subscript differ significantly (p , .05).136 ZEELENBERG ET AL.
In Study 1 we focused on real-life regret and disappointment. We asked
participants to recall an event from their own life in which they experienced
intense regret or disappointment. When asked to undo this event by changing
any aspect they wanted, participants who had reported a regret event mainly
mutated their own actions. However, participants who had reported a disap-
pointment event mainly mutated aspects in the situation. In addition we found
thatthe effectsof thesemutations onregret anddisappointment weremediated
by attributional processes.
In Study 2 we focused on emotional reactions to hypothetical events. Partici-
pants read a scenario in which a person experiences a negative outcome. The
cause of this outcome could in principle be construed as residing in the person’s
own actions, and/or in aspects of the situation. In accordance with our hypothe-
sis and consistent with Study 1, participants instructed to generate behavior-
focused counterfactuals reported more regret than disappointment. Likewise,
participants instructed to generate situation-focused counterfactuals reported
more disappointment than regret.
In Study 3 we replicated the findings from Study 2 using a different scenario
and a design in which the measurement of regret and disappointment was a
between-subjects factor. We again found that participants instructed to gener-
ate behavior-focused counterfactuals reported more intense regret than disap-
pointment, and that participants instructed to generate situation-focused
counterfactuals reported more intense disappointment than regret.
Implications for Norm Theory
The present research extends the ideas about emotional amplification pro-
posedinnormtheory(Kahneman&Miller,1986).Mostpreviousresearchonthe
influence of counterfactual thinking on emotion has shown that counterfactual
thoughts affect the intensity of affective reactions to outcomes. The easier it is
to generate a counterfactual outcome, the stronger is the affective reaction to
the factual outcome. The present research, together with that of Niedenthal
et al. (1994), shows that counterfactual thinking influences affective reaction
not only in this quantitative way, but also in a qualitative way. The type of
counterfactual thoughts, that is, their content and focus, determines which
specific emotion is felt.
We are only beginning to understand the role of counterfactual thought in
the causation of emotion, and there are still many unresolved questions. For
example, a comparison of the present findings with those of Niedenthal et al.
(1994) reveals that regret and guilt both result from the generation of behavior-
focused counterfactuals, thereby suggesting some fundamental similarities be-
tweentheseemotions.However,otherresearchers,workingwithinanappraisal
theory tradition, have shown that guilt and regret are different emotions (see,
e.g., Frijda et al. 1989; Roseman et al., 1994). The difference between regret
and guilt probably lies in the fact that guilt (in contrast with regret) is more
related to the violation of social or moral norms, or that guilt is more associated
with the perception of harming another person (or, conceivably, a living being).REGRET AND DISAPPOINTMENT 137
It might therefore be useful to look not only at what gets mutated (behavior,
character, or situation), but also at what gets undone by this mutation (e.g.,
does a normal behavior get undone, or does a violation of a social or moral
norm or the harming of another person get undone?).
Another way in which the present findings contribute to our understanding
of the role played by counterfactual thinking in the generation of emotions
concerns disappointment. Disappointment was found to be associated with the
generation of situation-focused counterfactuals. Levine (1996) has recently
suggested that disappointing events can result in sadness or anger, depending
on how the event is appraised. In keeping with this we argue that disappoint-
ment is likely to be associated with feelings of sadness when the situation-
focused counterfactuals concern things that were under no-one’s control (e.g.,
the weather), and with feelings of anger when the situation-focused counterfac-
tuals concern other persons’ behaviors.
Implications for Decision Research
Our findings concerning the role of counterfactual thinking seem relevant
for decision research as well. Although research on counterfactual thinking
initially focused on post-decisional reactions to outcomes or events, some re-
searchers have suggested that counterfactual thinking also influences future
decision-making (Boninger, Gleicher, & Strathman, 1994; Gleicher et al., 1995;
Miller, 1991; Taylor & Pham, 1996). When making decisions people sometimes
run a sort of mental simulation of what might happen before they actually
makethedecision.Inthiswaydecision-makers‘pre-computethepost-computed
thoughts’ (cf. Miller, 1991). As a result of these thoughts people may anticipate
the future regret and disappointment they might feel as a consequence of their
decision. This is exactly what is assumed in regret and disappointment theory
(Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1986, 1987). Following the line of
reasoning developed in the present paper, we suggest that when decision-
makers pre-compute behavior-focused counterfactuals, the possible future re-
gret will be made salient, and regret aversion will be promoted. Likewise,
when they pre-compute situation-focused counterfactuals, the possible future
disappointment will be made salient, and disappointment aversion will be the
result. How might decision-making processes be influenced the generation of
these different types of pre-decisional counterfactuals? In our view the pre-
computed behavior-focused thoughts and the pre-computed situation-focused
thoughts would have different effects on preference and choice.
There is considerable evidence concerning the role of anticipated regret in
decision-making. For example, Simonson (1992) asked consumers to imagine
the regret they would feel after deciding between two options and then finding
out that the other choice would have been a better one. Asking consumers to
generate these behavioral-focused thoughts made them more likely to purchase
an item that would shield them from this possible regret (i.e., a higher-priced,
well-known brand), over a potentially better item (a less expensive, but lesser-
known brand; see also Richard et al. [1996] for similar findings concerning138 ZEELENBERG ET AL.
decisions to engage in safe sex). More recently Zeelenberg et al. (1996; Zeelenb-
erg & Beattie, 1997) showed that decision-makers who anticipate post-deci-
sional counterfactual feedback choose to minimize the possible regret that
could stem from comparing what is with what might have been. By doing so
they made risk-seeking as well as risk-avoiding choices, depending on which
choice minimized the possible regret. We therefore predict that people who
pre-computebehavior-focusedcounterfactualswillanticipatefutureregret,and
will consequently choose the regret minimizing-option.
Research on anticipated disappointment is sparse. We predict, however, a
relationship between the anticipation of this emotion and risk aversion. If one
agrees with Bell’s definition of disappointment as a “psychological reaction to
an outcome that does not match up to expectations” (Bell, 1985, p. 1), it is clear
that risky options have a large potential to create disappointment (see also,
van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997). Safe options are ones that lead to a certain
outcome that is known in advance carry no risk of disappointment. One already
knowstheoutcome,andthereforetheoutcome istheexpectation(cf.Zeelenberg
et al., 1998c). In risky options, by contrast, the outcome can exceed or fall short
of the expectation level, and disappointment is therefore possible. We would
thus predict that people who pre-compute situation-focused counterfactuals
will anticipate this disappointment, and will consequently reduce the amount
of risk they are willing to take.
Conclusions
The present research focused on emotional reactions to decision outcomes.
Theresults showthatdifferent typesof counterfactualthoughtabout howthese
decision outcomes came about give rise to qualitatively different emotions.
Behavior-focused counterfactuals, in which the decision-maker’s behavior is
mutated,resultinfeelingsofregret,whereassituation-focusedcounterfactuals,
in which things that were not under the decision-maker’s control are mutated,
result in feelings of disappointment. This extends previous thinking about the
role of counterfactual thinking in emotional experiences, where the focus was
on emotional amplification. Extending the findings from the present research
on counterfactual thinking to that of the “pre-computation” of these thoughts,
resulted in testable hypotheses about the effects of this type of thinking, via
the anticipation of regret and disappointment, on decision-making. The pre-
computation of behavior-focused counterfactuals is hypothesized to result in
regret-minimizing choices, while the pre-computation of situation-focused
counterfactuals is hypothesized to result in disappointment-minimizing
choices.
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